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1
(1) There is no dispute about the state of the law
outside the Eleventh Circuit. Six circuits hold that a
plaintiff who proves that an employer’s explanation
was untrue is never required to adduce additional
evidence. Pet. 17-20. In five circuits such a plaintiff
at least usually is not required to offer additional
evidence. Pet. 20-21.
As the United States has correctly explained, on
the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit requires such additional evidence in all Title VII cases. In a recently
filed brief, the government spelled out with precision
the legal standard that is applied in that Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit, the government notes, applies
in Title VII cases "the pretext plus approach."1
1 "Pretext plus" is the phrase used by the lower courts to refer to the requirement that a plaintiff both prove that an eraployer’s proffered reason is untrue (the "pretext" evidence) and
offer "additional evidence" (the "plus") of discrimination. See
James v. New York Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2000)
("On the Fifth Circuit’s view in Reeves, under a rule often described as ’pretext plus,’ some additional evidence is always required."); Fasold v. Justice, 409 Fo3d 178, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2005) ("In
Reeves, the Court rejected the view of those circuits that had
granted summary judgment for the employer on the ground that
the terminated employee had failed to prove more than employer
pretext (the ’pretext plus’ cases)."); Leake v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouse, 5 Fed.Appx. 228, 232 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[under] the ’pretextplus’ standard..., which was the law of this circuit at the time the
district court rendered its decision, Leake was required to demonstrate that the explanation proffered by Ryan’s was pretextual
and produce evidence (beyond his prima facie case) that the real
reason for his discharge was retaliation for his sexual harassment
complaints. See Vaughan v. Metrahealth Cos., 145 F.3d 197, 202
(4th Cir. 1998). Since the district court decided this case, however,
the Supreme Court has rejected the pretext-plus standard.");

2
Secretary’s Brief, Mells v. Secretary, Department of VeteransAffairs, No. 15-14251-GG (11th Cir.), at 31, available at 2016 WL 1295652 (Feb. 25, 2016) ("Department
of Justice Brief").
[T]his Court has interpreted Reeves [v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133
(2000)] to mean that the law no longer permits an inference of unlawful discrimination
based solely on the plaintiff’s proffer of evidence establishing a prima facie case and contradicting the employer’s proffered reasons
for the challenged action, and that the plaintiff now must ... not only [show] that the employer’s proffered reason was a pretext, but
also .o. " ... produce additional evidence suggesting discrimination after contradicting
their employer’s stated reasons .... "Flowers [v.
Troup County School Dist.], 803 F.3d [1329],
1339 [(11th Cir. 2016)].
Department of Justice Brief, 37-38.
The Flowers panel interpreted Reeves to mean
that"[c]ontradicting the [employer’s] asserted
reason alone ... no longer supports an inference of unlawful discrimination." Id. Therefore, [plaintiff’s] argument that the district
court incorrectly required her to produce evidence of pretext and additional evidence of
Cervantez v. KMGP Serv. Co., Inc., 349 F.3d 4, 10 (5th Cir. 2009)
("Reeves rejected the higher standard of ’pretext plus,’ which ’require[d] a plaintiff not only to disprove an employer’s proffered
reasons for the discrimination but also to introduce additional evidence of discrimination.’ ") (quoting Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med.
Pers., LP, 363 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2004)).

discrimination ... ignores this Court’s postReeves decisions regarding the manner in
which Reeves ... modified this Court’s decision
in Combs [v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th
Cir. 2000)].
Id. at 36. The United States pointed out that the decision below (and earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions on
which it relied) were of particular importance because
they established a more stringent requirement than
had previously existed in that circuit.
[In Flowers] this Court confirmed that although the law of this circuit (e.g., Combs)
previously allowed plaintiffs to get their employment discrimination claims before a jury
"after making a prima facie case and merely
contradicting the [employer’s] proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason," Reeves had
"closed this avenue for Title VII plaintiffs."
Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1339 (emphasis added).
Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added in Department of Justice
Brief).2
Florida correctly interprets Eleventh Circuit precedent in the same manner as the United States.

2 See id. at 37 ("[in] the post-Reeves decisions (Chapman Iv.
AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000)], Alvarez [v. Royal
Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010)], and Flowers)
this Court explained that the law no longer permits an inference
of unlawful discrimination based solely on the plaintiffs showing
of a prima facie case and evidence contradicting the employer’s
proffered reasons for the challenged action....").
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[A]lthough previously Plaintiff could have
gotten her claims to a jury after making a
prima facie case and undercutting [a defendant’s] proffered legitimate non-discriminatory
reason as pretext, "intervening precedent has
since closed this avenue for Title VII plaintiffs." Flowers, [App. 23a]. Contradicting [a defendant’s] asserted reason alone no longer
supports an inference of unlawful discrimination .... Because Plaintiffhas failed to put forth
any additional evidence that would support
an inference of unlawful discrimination, it is
insufficient for Plaintiff merely to make a
prima facie case and ... call into question
[a defendant’s] proffered, nondiscriminatory
reason. The burden placed on Title VII plaintiffs to produce additional evidence is not
great, but neither is it nothing.
Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment,
Jiminez v. Florida Commission on Human Relations,
No. 4:15-cv-00103-RH-CAS (N.D.Fla.), available at 2015
WL 10354050 (emphasis added) ("Florida Brief").3
Within the Eleventh Circuit there simply is no dispute that that circuit requires "additional evidence"
over and above proof that an employer gave a phony
reason to justify a disputed adverse employment action. Plaintiffs and defendants alike agree that this is
the rule in the Eleventh Circuit. Compare Answer
3 See Florida Commission on Human Relations’ Trial Memorandum, Jiminez v. Florida Commission on Human Relations,
No. 4:15-cv-00103-RH-CAS (N.D.Fla.), available at 2015 WL
10354046.
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Brief of Appellee, Holmes v. Jefferson County School
District, 2016 WL 1375998, No. 15-15198 (11th Cir.), at
21, available at 2016 WL 1375998 ("Contradicting the
School District’s asserted reason alone, ... no longer
supports an inference of unlawful discrimination.")
(quoting Flowers), with Appellant’s Reply Brief,
Holmes v. Jefferson County School District, No. 1515198 (11th Cir.), at 6, available at 2016 WL 1375998
("Defendant argues that [plaintiff] failed to meet the
long-standing disavowed standard of ’pretext-plus’ claiming that she failed to present additional evidence
outside of pretext and her prima facie case .... [Plaintiff] concedes that a panel of this Court recently held
this to be the standard in Flowers .... [H]owever, [Plaintiff] argues that this case is in violation of Reeves .... ").
(2) The brief in opposition systematically ignores
the language of the opinion below which the United
States and Florida correctly understand to be the holding of that decision.
Respondents insist that the Eleventh Circuit does
not impose an additional evidence requirement. "The
Eleventh Circuit does not always require additional
evidence where evidence suggests that an employer’s
explanation is false. It simply confirmed Reeves’s own
statement that there are some circumstances where
what little evidence of pretext the plaintiff has put forward simply cannot withstand summary judgment."
Br. Opp. 12 (emphasis added and omitted). But the critical limitation "some" does not appear anywhere in the
opinion below. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit insisted

6
without limitation that "[t]he burden [is] placed on Title VII plaintiffs to produce additional evidence after
contradicting their employer’s stated reasons .... "App.
24a.4 This definitive statement of the Eleventh Circuit
standard, specifically relied on by the Department of
Justice and quoted in the petition, is never mentioned
in the brief in opposition. See Department of Justice
Brief, 37; Pet. 15, 33.
Respondents point to older Eleventh Circuit decisions from 2001 to 2005 under which plaintiffs previously were not required to adduce additional evidence,
and insist that the decision below does not "clash with
that court’s prior precedents." Br. Opp. 9.5 But the opinion below was emphatic in explaining that such precedents are no longer good law in the Eleventh Circuit.
"Contradicting the School District’s asserted reason
alone ... no longer supports an inference of unlawful
discrimination." App. 23a. "At one time under this
Circuit’s law, Flowers could have gotten his claims
before a jury after making a prima facie case and
4 See App. 23a ("[c]ontradicting the [defendant’s] asserted
reason alone ... no longer supports an inference of unlawful discrimination"; discrediting an employer’s proffered reason "is
sometimes enough when combined with other evidence...." (quoting Kragor v. Takeda Pharm. A., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2012)) (emphasis in opinion below), 23a-24a ("Because ...
Flowers has failed to put forth any additional evidence that would
support an inference of unlawful discrimination, it is insufficient
for Flowers merely to make a prima facie case and ... call into
question the School District’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.").
~ See Br. Opp. 1 (the panel decision "did not overturn those
decisions").

7
merely contradicting the [defendant’s] proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason .... Intervening precedent has since closed this avenue for Title VII
plaintiffs." App. 22a-23a. The latter passage makes
clear that the requirement of additional evidence applies to "Title VII plaintiffs" generally, not just to some
narrow subset of cases. These definitive statements,
specifically cited by the Department of Justice and the
state of Florida as setting out the Eleventh Circuit
rule, and repeatedly quoted in the petition, are never
mentioned in the brief in opposition. See Department
of Justice Brief, 36; Florida Brief; Pet. 13, 14, 16, 33.
Respondents insist that "[t]he panel in no way suggested that a plaintiff must negate every conceivable
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action taken
against him. It noted only, and correctly, that ’Flowers
has the burden of persuasion on this point, and it is his
responsibility to advance sufficient evidence of racial
discrimination to create a triable factual dispute.’" Br.
Opp. 13 (quoting Pet. App. 21a) (emphasis in brief).
The adverb "only" is incorrect. The sentence from the
opinion quoted in the brief in opposition ("Flowers has
the burden .... ") is preceded on page 21a by an entire
paragraph of the panel opinion specifically devoted to
the failure of the plaintiff to rule out the "virtually limitless possible nondiscriminatory reasons" that might
have prompted the employer’s action. App. 21a. The
court of appeals reasoned that proof an employer’s
proffered justification is a lie only eliminates one
possible nondiscriminatory reason for the disputed
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employment action; "additional evidence" of discrimination is required because so many other "possible"
reasons remain. This pivotal explanation for the Eleventh Circuit’s "additional evidence" requirement, repeatedly quoted in the petition, is never mentioned in
the brief in opposition. See Pet. 14, 16, 17, 28, 34.
Even if the panel opinion did announce an "additional evidence" requirement, respondents assert, that
would just have been dicta, because the court of appeals in any event concluded that plaintiff had failed
to call into question the veracity of the defendants’ explanation. Respondents state that "[t]he panel simply
rejected Flowers’s showing of pretext." Br. Opp. 9 (citing Pet. App. 22a).~ To the contrary, the panel actually
concluded that the evidence would "support an inference that the School District’s investigation into Flowers’s potential recruiting violations may have been
pretext of something." App. 19a-20a (emphasis omitted). Respondents claim that "[t]he Eleventh Circuit ...
simply affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that
Flowers did not set forth sufficient evidence to suggest
that the School District’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was false." Br. Opp. 1. To the contrary, the panel held that the evidence did call into
6 See Br. Opp. 7 ("The court of appeals [held] there was no
showing of pretext...."), 8 ("The Eleventh Circuit ... conclude[ed]
that [plaintiff] had failed to produce sufficient evidence suggesting that the School District’s proffered reason for terminating him
was pretext."), 11 ("the Eleventh Circuit ... held that Flowers did
not sufficiently rebut the School District’s proffered reason....")
(emphasis in brief in opposition).
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question the veracity of the School District’s story, reasoning that"[t]he School District’s ham-handed investigation and actions singling out Flowers could lead a
reasonable jury to conclude that Pugh had it in for
Flowers from the beginning." App. 20a. The court of appeals’ holdings that there was indeed evidence of pretext, quoted in the petition, are never mentioned in the
brief in opposition. See Pet. 12, 13.
In sum, this is not a case in which the respondents
discuss the meaning of the relevant portions of the
court of appeals opinion. Rather, respondents make no
effort to explain and never even refer to the pivotal
passages in the opinion below. Respondents do not
disagree with the interpretation of those passages set
out in the briefs of the Department of Justice and the
state of Florida, and in the petition; instead, respondents simply choose to ignore those operative portions
of the Eleventh Circuit opinion. Such studied silence is
no substitute for a reasoned analysis.
(3) Having prevailed in the court below by
persuading the Eleventh Circuit to adopt a clear
and emphatic "additional evidence" requirement, respondents now seek to avoid review in this Court by
insisting that there was no such holding. But that tactical disavowal of the Eleventh Circuit’s landmark decision is operative in this Court only; in the lower
courts the additional evidence requirement mandated
by the court of appeals is obviously the law. No judge
in that circuit would today hold that a plaintiff can
"g[et] his claims before a jury [by] making a prima facie
case and ... contradicting the [defendant’s] legitimate,
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nondiscriminatory reason," in light of the Eleventh
Circuit’s emphatic decision that "precedent has ...
closed this avenue for Title VII plaintiffs." App. 22a23a. In order to assure that this additional evidence
requirement would control future litigation in the
Eleventh Circuit, the panel went out of its way to designate its opinion for publication. In that circuit, most
appellate opinions in employment cases are unpublished.
The decision of the Eleventh Circuit imposing
an additional evidence requirement in this Title VII
case warrants review for the reasons that led this
Court to grant review when the Fifth Circuit imposed
such a requirement under the ADEA. Reeves, 530 U.S.
at 140-41. Both decisions conflict with the law in other
circuits, and both requirements pose an often insurmountable and always unjustified obstacle to the enforcement of the statute at issue. As the United States
explained in its brief in Reeves, the removal of such obstacles is necessary "[t] o overcome the scarcity of direct
proof of discriminatory motive, and to ensure that the
’important national policy’ embodied in the fair employment laws is achieved." Brief for the United States
and The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 11 (quoting United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711, 716 (1983)).
This case presents the ideal vehicle for
resolving this issue. The court of appeals set out a
clear additional evidence requirement and offered a

11
full-throated explanation for its holding that a Title
VII plaintiff cannot demonstrate the existence of a discriminatory motive "merely" by proving that an employer’s proffered reason for its actions is a lie. App.
22a. Respondents contend that rejection of this legal
standard would not affect the outcome in this case because there was no evidence that its explanation was
untrue. Br. Opp. 11. But the court of appeals held that
there was indeed such evidence, and dismissed Flowers’ claim only because under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent - unlike the rule in all other circuits such proof is legally insufficient.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Eleventh Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
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